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Statistical Panopticism and Its Critique  
Rainer Diaz-Bone ∗ 
Abstract: »Statistischer Panoptismus und dessen Kritik«. The article develops the 
concept of statistical panopticism, thereby combining the French approach of 
economics of convention (EC) and Michel Foucault’s concept of panopticism. 
The differences between Foucault’s original notion of panopticism and statisti-
cal panopticism are emphasized. It is argued that statistical panopticism has 
been made possible by the enormous growth of quantification, datafication, 
linking, and centralization of numerical data production, data collection, and 
data analysis. This has been (mainly) realized by private enterprises and imple-
mented in different social spheres but also in private situations. From the per-
spective of EC, quantification, big data, and statistical panopticism have to be 
related to the foundational conventions of data production (measurement) and 
data interpretation. Foucault has analyzed the neoliberal and indirect form of 
contemporary governance. Statistical panopticism works as a dispositive for 
this neoliberal form of governance. Its asymmetric and mainly invisible charac-
ter is sketched. Also the critique and the deficiencies of critique of political and 
economic usages of numerical data and indicators are discussed. 
Keywords: Panopticism, Foucault, economics of convention, quantification, ne-
oliberalism, big data, statistics. 
1.   Introduction 
Sociology of quantification has studied not only the diversity and the impact of 
numbers in everyday life, science and mass media. It has studied also the ideo-
logical and hegemonic effects exerted by numbers in different social fields. 
Nowadays, in times of the Internet, of computerization, digitalization and data-
fication numbers are omnipresent. Key words like “big data,” “smart data anal-
ysis,” or “data mining” articulate these tendencies (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier 2013; Kitchin 2014; Japec et al. 2015). Public demand for the represen-
tation by numbers is still increasing and the public as well as individuals re-
quest for “realistic” numbers, representing social facts “as they are”. Trust in 
numbers is mainly based on trust in institutions generating those numbers as 
state administrations, scientific organizations, NGOs, and enterprises, which 
are recognized for their reputation. Trust in numbers supports recognized legit-
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imacy of information and facilitates communication (Porter 1995) and can 
enhance the efficiency and the power of governance. Quantification exerted via 
standardization equips numerical information with the image of objectivity. 
Phrases like “governing by numbers” (Desrosières 2008b) or “world of indica-
tors” (Rottenburg et al. 2015) indicate from sociological standpoints the rising 
power of number-based governance.  
From a sociological point of view there are two important areas of research, 
which aim to discover problems of legitimacy and the expulsion of public 
deliberation about the conventional foundations of measurement and data pro-
duction. First, actors are less and less interested in the principles of data con-
struction and its conventionalist bases (as definitions of indicators, which can 
be conceived as conventions). This disinterest is nourished by more and more 
complex procedures of data production, because of involved technologies, 
scientific conventions and because of an increasing degree of labor division in 
chains of data production. These aspects enhance the necessary effort to track 
the statistical chain and to understand the complexity of data production. Sec-
ond, more and more data production processes are invisible for the public and 
are run by private agencies (as enterprises). These data are used for market 
research, geo-tracking, consumer scoring, crime prevention, and in many other 
ways, which provide companies with opportunities to make profit. But also 
governments step by step implemented data bases to represent, analyze and 
track their citizens. Public recognition and usages of numbers as societal repre-
sentations step by step became more and more detached from the societal con-
trol and knowledge about conditions of data production. This growing cleavage 
between convention-based, technically complex data production on one side 
and public representations, usages, and expectations on the other side results in 
a public misrecognition (of what data represent), because the public rejects the 
idea of data as “social construction” based on conventions and influenced by 
involved techniques and practices of measurement. The public and everyday 
actors do expect data to be a “true representation” of a pre-given social reality, 
i.e., a reality in the sense most natural scientists conceive as one physical reali-
ty (independent of conventions, measurement techniques and measurement 
practices). Simultaneously, huge masses of data are gathered by state organiza-
tions and by private enterprises, which exploit big data for purposes of control 
and profit, detached from public deliberative legitimization.1 Especially private 
companies generate and collect data, which are not based on established con-
ventions (justifiable definitions), but which are measured “ad hoc”, i.e., without 
a controlled implementation of an exact concept of what is to be measured, 
                                                             
1  “Big data” is mostly characterized only by formal aspects. A common definition of big data 
is data which are characterized in “volume” (depth, breadth and amount of data), “velocity“ 
(speed and volatility of data) and “variety“ (the heterogeneity of data formats), see Kitchin 
(2014) and Japec et al. (2015). 
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how it is to be measured and for which purpose. As it will be argued below, the 
coherence and (political) adequacy of conventions with collective intentionality 
and common goods are important (as economics of convention argues), be-
cause this enables the production of indicators, numbers, and data, which can 
support collective action in a valid way. 
The argument developed here is that political and economic governance in 
modern societies has invented a specific form of power, which was already 
analyzed by the French historian and sociologist Michel Foucault. Foucault 
identified a constellation of dispositives, which were aligned to survey and to 
control individual’s behavior in modern societies, stimulating normed, stand-
ardized and self-exerted behavior by these individuals. The everyday immateri-
al and material practical mechanisms (of observing, inspecting, categorizing 
and hierarchizing, sanctioning etc.), which implanted these personal disposi-
tions and formed modern social behavior, groups and categorical identities, 
were analyzed by Foucault as the microphysics of power and Foucault called 
this form of control “panopticism” (Foucault 1995). Nowadays, the importance 
of numerical data as a core element of this societal control and individual self-
conduct rises, i.e., data and datafication become ubiquitous. Even if data usage 
is mostly detached by an adequate understanding of its genealogy, the perva-
siveness of figures as upcoming forms of representing social phenomena and 
social trends but also one’s social position, one’s social and individual behavior 
is the cornerstone of the evaluation, valuation and control of modern individu-
als and the governance of modern populations. Therefore, one can speak of an 
upcoming “statistical panopticism” as a recent and powerful dispositive for the 
governance of the self and of others in the sense of Michel Foucault (2007a, 
2008). Datafication and quantification have invaded not only the public sphere 
(mass media and state activities), but also the private sphere2 – making individ-
uals, groups and whole populations visible for different kinds of actors as pri-
vate enterprises exploiting these “personal data” for their economic interest. 
And this visibility of “private” activities cannot be longer conceived as restrict-
ed to the immediate personal environment, as social media and the use of apps 
make evident. These data are accessible by other actors (as unknown Internet 
users, state institutions, private companies etc.) This upcoming phenomenon 
will be framed in a conceptual and exploratory way and its tensions and con-
tradictions (as identified here in a preliminary way) will be discussed, referring 
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and new tools for self-quantification of personal life and their interconnection (buzz words 
are “Internet of things“, “smart cities”, “smart homes”). 
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to Michel Foucault’s work and the approach of economics of convention (in 
short EC).3 
This contribution will first present EC as its theoretical and methodological 
starting point, which is also a main foundation for sociology of quantification 
(section 2). Foucault’s concepts of power-knowledge and of panopticism will 
be introduced, related to the new forms of data-based governance and the con-
cept of statistical panopticism will be introduced (section 3). Afterwards, some 
problems of contemporary social critique facing statistical panopticism as a 
form of (neoliberal) governance will be discussed from the perspective of eco-
nomics of convention and compared to Foucault’s earlier notion of panopticism 
(section 4). Finally, the new positioning of social research and its institutions 
will be considered, facing the growing influence of private organizations’ ex-
pertise in the field of indicators and social sciences (section 5). 
2.  Economics of Convention and Statistics 
The words “state” and “statistics” share the same semantical roots. The Italian 
word “etatista” means “men who care about state affairs”. It was Alain 
Desrosières (1998, 2008a, 2008b, 2011a, 2011b), who worked out the most 
sophisticated sociological theory for the analysis of quantification, which is 
related to a “political economy of quantification” (Didier and Droesbeke 2014; 
Bruno et al. 2016; Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016), emphasizing the political di-
mension of statistics, data, and big data. He also was closely related to the 
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary scientific movement of the “economics 
of convention” or “convention theory” (in short EC), which from the early 
1980s on became a new complex and pragmatist institutionalism, and which 
nowadays is part of the new French social sciences (Corcuff 2011). This insti-
tutionalism readjusts the two “megaparadigms” of structuralism and pragma-
tism in a new way. It was the close cooperation between Desrosières and the 
founders of EC, which made the socio-economic analysis of classification and 
quantification one of the starting points of EC (Desrosières 2011a). Mainly 
Laurent Thévenot (2011, 2016a) and Robert Salais (2012, 2016), but also rep-
resentatives of the second generation as Emmanuel Didier, Thomas Amossé, 
Cécile Brousse, Laura Centemeri, and others continued this strand of EC’s 
research from the 1980s to the present. Also, Alain Desrosières worked in more 
and more a conventionalist position until his death in 2013, so that especially 
his later workings are regarded as being part of EC (Diaz-Bone 2018).  
                                                             
3  This article continues a line of argument about quantification, measurement, and big data 
from the perspective of economics of convention, which was initiated in two contributions 
to this journal (see Diaz-Bone 2016, 2017). 
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Convention theory focuses on coordination between actors, who rely on a 
plurality of conventions as logics of coordination, interpretation and evaluation 
in situations (Storper and Salais 1997; Favereau and Lazega 2002).4 For EC, 
conventions are not to be confused with customs or standards only. Instead, 
conventions are understood as metaphysical principles, present in empirical 
situations as imaginary culturally established frames, actors can rely on to 
achieve a common goal and a common good (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
As a pragmatist institutionalism EC acknowledges actor’s competences to 
judge the adequacy of conventions, to adapt to conventions and to switch con-
ventions if needed (Dosse 1998a; Nachi 2006; Corcuff 2011). EC integrates the 
material equipment of situations with cognitive formats and objects (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006). In recent years, EC became more and more known outside 
of France.5 
One of EC’s birth moments has been the analysis of statistical categories at 
the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Analysis (INSEE). 
Categories, categorization and quantitative (metric) measurement are all con-
ceived as being based on conventions, how to define categories and how to 
apply measurement instruments (as classifications, metric scales etc.). As 
Desrosières stated “to quantify is to implement a convention and then to meas-
ure” (Desrosières 2008a, 10). Desrosières and Thévenot (2002, 35) studied 
different ways, how the reality of indicators and quantitative information, their 
socially perceived “ontology” is interpreted by different actors. The conven-
tionalist’s notion of “statistical chain” grasps the different steps in the produc-
tion and circulation of statistical data. For Desrosières, it is statisticians, who 
know well about the foundational role of conventions, needed in the beginning 
of the statistical chain. Quantitative measurement, indicators and classifications 
need a starting definition to be implemented and they need related practices, 
how to identify values and categories in the process of measurement. Statisti-
cians know that this start of the data production could have been chosen differ-
ently, other conventions as foundations would have been possible, too. And in 
the course of data circulation and publication, the way the character of these 
data is valued can change, because new actors address expectations in the on-
tology of these data. As, for example, in case of unemployment rates, the poli-
ticians, the public, and citizens expect numbers to represent a “realist” unem-
ployment rate, a value of an indicator which represents a social reality, which 
exists independently of statisticians’ decisions (with conventions of measure-
                                                             
4  The most important monographs are Boltanski and Thévenot, Storper, and Salais. See for an 
overview the contributions in Eymard-Duvernay (ed. 2006a, 2006b), in Favereau and Lazega 
(eds. 2002) and in Batifoulier et al. (eds. 2016). For an introduction see Diaz-Bone (2018). 
5  In this journal, a series of special issues collecting contributions of the approach of conven-
tion theory have been published; see Diaz-Bone and Salais (eds. 2011, 2012), Diaz-Bone et 
al. (eds. 2015), Diaz-Bone and Didier (eds. 2016). 
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ment to apply). The main problem of a statistical chain is the possibility of 
undermining its coherence. This happens – as sketched above – when the dif-
ferent steps of the chain are structured by ways of measuring, interpreting and 
using data, i.e., conventions which are contradictory. The problem is that the 
figures alone do not represent the involved conventions, which is the reason 
why incoherence is possible. Applied to the example of measuring unemploy-
ment incoherence is possible, when politicians argue that the unemployment 
rate represents at the end (of the chain) a pre-given fact, unaffected by conven-
tions invested in the beginning (of the chain). This realist argument is mislead-
ing and interprets the figures in an invalid way. Convention theory has focused 
on different influences, which undermine the coherence of the statistical chain. 
Studies identified different mechanisms as different micro-politics of involved 
groups of agents (Thévenot 1981), as incoherent sets of quality criteria, where 
the incoherence is caused by tensions between underlying conventions 
(Desrosières 1995) or as developing systems of categories bringing in new 
employment categories in statistical chains, thereby disturbing established 
categories and established coherences (Salais et al. 1999). 
Desrosières has characterized the transformation of the character of numeri-
cal information from its conventionalist beginnings to a realist representation of 
a “pre-given and foregoing reality”, in which statisticians play different roles. 
In their everyday practice, statisticians are plunged into a world of conven-
tions, which they record or shape themselves. The fact that the measurement 
results from this sequencing of conventional decisions is therefore self-evident 
to them. Later, however, they change hats without realizing it, and speak a re-
alist language when addressing the outside world. (Desrosières 2009, 320) 
Indicators are produced and distributed in statistical chains with a high degree 
of labor division.6 From the perspective of convention theory there are different 
important questions. Is the statistical chain coherent and does it keep its integri-
ty, which was initially implemented by bringing in a convention (or a constella-
tion of conventions) as coordinating logic of the different steps of measure-
ment? Does the generated numerical information finally support a collective 
intentionality to achieve a common goal and common good? Can the numerical 
representation be criticized and justified for its valid convention-based produc-
tion and application? What is the spatial and temporal scope of the statistical 
chain? How is numerical representation integrated into more personal envi-
ronments and regimes of engagement? What is the link between governance 
and statistics? These questions are applied as the analytical (and also critical) 
perspective, introduced by convention theory. EC’s concept of convention can 
be regarded as an empirical normative foundation for indicators, because con-
ventions represent a way of thinking what is correct and suitable. This norma-
                                                             
6  See for the concept of distributed cognition Hutchins (1995), who has been influential for 
EC (Diaz-Bone 2018). 
HSR 44 (2019) 2  │  83 
tive foundation acts as frame in processes as operationalization (“defining” 
categories and variables), the measurement acts (e.g., handling of instruments), 
the interpretation and evaluation of numbers.7 Data are always embedded in 
situations of coordination, interpretation and evaluation structured by conven-
tions. These conventions work also as conventions of equivalence, enabling 
actors to generate comparable data (Desrosières 2005).8 Therefore, the sole 
figure does not guarantee in itself a complete meaning. The perspective of a 
pluralist normative foundation of quantification and of the production as such 
characterizes EC as a pragmatist approach in two ways.  
1) Conventions as foundations of indicators can be seen as an explicit or 
implicit element of wider and embedding social science theories or scien-
tific world views. Conventions are the normative foundations for quanti-
fications and conventions are orders of justification, which Boltanski and 
Thévenot (2006) emphasized, and these normative foundations (and or-
ders of justification) offer a narrative semantic content, which contributes 
to an enhanced scope of the statistical chain (Diaz-Bone 2017).9 EC 
avoids separating numbers from practical normativities and embedding 
situations, and also avoids a fact/value dichotomy as pragmatists like 
Dewey (1938) and Putnam (1992, 2002) do.  
2) Because of the plurality of existing conventions, there are different pos-
sible ways, how to operationalize indicators, how to measure and how to 
interpret and evaluate data. All in all, the pragmatist perspective of EC 
differs from a positivist or Weberian position, which only accepts meth-
odological standards as normative foundation, while pragmatism recog-
nizes practical value systems and conventions as socio-cultural frames as 
being influential for quantification.  
In recent years, conventionalists have addressed the impact of neoliberalism on 
quantification. First, Desrosières (2011b) sketched the transformation of statis-
tics toward a dipositive for stimulating (“rational”) economic behavior and the 
replacement of state administration by private agencies. Neoliberalism has been 
characterized as the intrusion of market principles into formerly non-economic 
social spheres. But seen from the sociology of privatization, neoliberalism can 
be characterized also as privatization of data production, including the privati-
zation and invisibilization of the underlying conventions.10 
                                                             
7  For a classical formulation of this position see John Dewey (1938, especially chapter IX). 
8  See for commensuration of quantitative data also Dewey (1938, 202). 
9  It has been the neo-pragmatist Hilary Putnam, who worked out the interconnection of 
“facts” (numbers), theories, and values: “(1) Knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of 
theories. (2) Knowledge of theories presupposes knowledge of facts. (3) Knowledge of facts 
presupposes knowledge of values. (4) Knowledge of values presupposes knowledge of facts.” 
(Putnam 1992, 23)  
10  See for the argument in more detail Diaz-Bone (2016, 2017). 
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3.  Power-Knowledge and Panopticism 
One of the most influential social scientists since the middle of the 20th century 
is the French theorist Michel Foucault (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982; Eribon 
1991; Dosse 1998b, 1998c). His work on the historical reorganization of the 
institutional structure and the orders of knowledge in fields as health (Foucault 
1973), madness (Foucault 2006) or the penal system (Foucault 1995) opened 
up a new perspective of agency and mechanisms of socio-historical institution-
al change. For Foucault, change is not driven by established explanatory prin-
ciples such as technology, interests of social classes or the battle for resources. 
Instead, Foucault studies the mobilizations of institutional and discursive 
change in long-term processes, thereby outlining the constellation of new ele-
ments as dispositives, practices, strategies, discursive notions, and problemati-
zations. Similar to new French social sciences, Foucault integrates a pragmatist 
approach to his analysis of socio-historical change centering processes instead 
of structures and substances.11 Agency, therefore is conceived as distributed to 
different influential elements.12 Here it is important to refer to Foucault’s genu-
ine concept of power and his analysis of the link between power and 
knowledge. Knowledge, bodies, institutions and power are not interpreted as 
given substances respectively structures but as simultaneously accumulated by 
and invested in processes. In his study of the prison, Foucault invents the no-
tion of micro-physics of power, organized in relations of power and penetrating 
the social. 
Now, the study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power exercised on 
the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of 
domination are attributed not to ‘appropriation’, but to dispositions, manoeu-
vres, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network 
of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one 
might possess; that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than 
a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory. In short, this 
power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or 
preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions 
– an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those 
who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an ob-
ligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is 
transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as 
                                                             
11  In this regard, Foucault’s approach to historical social research is close to the methodologies 
of John Dewey and Arthur Bentley (1949) or Charles Tilly (2006, 2008). 
12  But in difference to pragmatic French sociology, Foucault’s theory sticks to structuralist 
concepts as episteme, which is a deeper and unconscious pattern structuring discourses 
(Foucault 1989). One could conceive the concept of convention also as a structuralist one, 
but conventions are cognitive resources, which can be reflected on by competent actors 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). See for comparison and perspectives of combination of EC 
and Foucault’s concept Diaz-Bone 2019. 
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they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This 
means that these relations go right down into the depths of society, that they 
are not localized in the relations between the state and its citizens or on the 
frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, at the level of 
individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviour, the general form of the law or 
government; […]. (Foucault 1995, 26-27) 
Power cannot be localized in state institutions or positions of social leadership. 
Foucault emphasizes the generating and productive effects, which are induced 
by power and in power relations. This opens up a new frame for the analysis of 
knowledge, which is not seen as the negation of power or regarded only as 
starting point to exert or to multiply power, but which is also generated by 
power and emerges out of power relations. 
[…] we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that 
knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that 
knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its inter-
ests. Perhaps, we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, 
by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of 
knowledge. We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not 
simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it 
is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is 
neither any power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the 
same time power relations. These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be ana-
lysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not 
free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, a subject who knows 
the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge to be regarded as so 
many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their 
historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of 
knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, 
but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of 
which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of 
knowledge. (Foucault 1995, 27-28) 
In EC, power has long been an underdeveloped notion. Only recently, conven-
tionalists have worked out a conventionalist perspective on power (Thévenot 
2016b) or have applied Foucaultian concepts, which are closely linked to Fou-
cault’s concept of power as Favereau’s reference to the Foucaultian concept of 
dispositive (Favereau 2014). 
An architectural principle, which aims to multiply discipline and power ef-
fects, was developed by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Bentham 
designed a building as a rotunda. Bentham aimed for architecture efficient to 
survey workers in a fabric or prisoners in a prison. In the center, Bentham 
placed the position of an individual in task of control and surveying, as an 
officer. This architectural principle is called “panopticon”. At the end of the 
18th century, Bentham (1791) presented his consideration to effectuate the 
surveillance of workers or prisoners and he also sketched the architecture of 
such a building (see Picture 1). 
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Picture 1: Panopticon (Jeremy Bentham 1791) 
 
In the architecture of prisons, a tower in the center made a permanent and ef-
fective surveillance of the prisoners possible. Foucault’s famous study about 
the development of the modern prison identified the circular architecture of the 
prison building with a surveying tower in its center as a paradigm for the or-
ganization of power in modern societies. This architectural principle is general-
izable to organizations in others spheres of society by Foucault, such as facto-
ries or schools. He introduces the notion of “disciplines” as methods to exert 
power on the subject’s body.13 
Panopticism is the general principle of a new ‘political anatomy’ whose object 
and end are not the relations of sovereignty but the relations of discipline. The 
celebrated, transparent, circular cage, with its high tower, powerful and know-
ing, may have been for Bentham a project of a perfect disciplinary institution; 
but he also set out to show how one may ‘unlock’ the disciplines and get them 
to function in a diffused, multiple, polyvalent way throughout the whole social 
body. These disciplines, which the classical age had elaborated in specific, 
relatively enclosed places – barracks, schools, workshops – and whose total 
implementation had been imagined only at the limited and temporary scale of 
a plague-stricken town, Bentham dreamt of transforming into a network of 
mechanisms that would be everywhere and always alert, running through so-
ciety without interruption in space or in time. The panoptic arrangement pro-
                                                             
13  “These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, 
which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of 
docility-utility, might be called 'disciplines‘.“ (Foucault 1995, 137) 
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vides the formula for this generalization. It programs, at the level of an ele-
mentary and easily transferable mechanism, the basic functioning of a society 
penetrated through and through with disciplinary mechanisms. (Foucault 
1995, 208-209) 
Although Foucault was interested in the disciplining mechanism as well as in 
the social processes of forming modern individual subjects, this concept is also 
closely linked to knowledge and knowledge production. Visibility of individu-
als’ behavior is therefore one core element of panopticism. For the argument 
developed here, it is important to recognize that visibility is an asymmetric 
property. It comprises prisoners and workers, who are visible for the person 
watching them but not vice versa. The inside of the tower in many of the pris-
ons, built after the panoptic principle, normally cannot be seen by the surveilled 
individuals. These individuals shall develop knowledge of being permanently 
surveilled. The panoptic architecture itself becomes the dispositive of surveil-
lance; it is not a single individual which is important as observer. The conse-
quence of this asymmetric situation is that the tower could be empty and un-
manned.  
Linking the introduced notion of power-knowledge to panopticism, opens 
the possibility to think of knowledge-production based on practices and panop-
tical dispositives. Power-Knowledge is generated for purposes and as result of 
the implementation and proceeding of panoptical dispositives. In fact, there are 
only a handful of buildings, which are perfect realizations of Bentham’s panop-
ticon. The architecture of panopticism, as sketched by Bentham, is a more 
general principle and nowadays it is extended by technologies as video surveil-
lance and computer-based forms of surveillance. Here, the asymmetry of being 
tracked but not being able to recognize who is observing and what is done with 
the collected data is enforced by technology. The new quality, which multiplies 
the power-knowledge effect, is one of the features of technological centraliza-
tion, storage and analysis of data.  
4.  Statistical Panopticism  
Extending Foucault’s concept of panopticism, one can introduce the concept of 
statistical panopticism.14 There are some differences between these two con-
cepts. 
                                                             
14  This concept has many aspects in common with Zuboff’s concepts as “information panopti-
cism” (Zuboff 1988) or “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff 2015). The main difference should 
be seen in the conceptual integration with EC which brings in a substantial theoretical ap-
proach for measuring and value, which is missing in Zuboff’s approach. In difference to “in-
formation panopticism” the notion of “statistical panopticism” also emphasizes EC’s interest 
in the analysis of economic coordination and valuation. See for an overview of sociological 
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(1) In contrast to the Foucaultian notion of panopticism (in which numerical 
information is only one form of cognitive representation), statistical panopti-
cism as dispositive is based essentially on numerical information and especially 
on the new digital technologies and the growing pervasiveness of these tech-
nologies, which produce numerical data on individuals (their behavior, perfor-
mance, their rankings etc.). An exemplary field in which cognition, knowledge, 
and information are transformed numerical data is health, one of the most rapid 
changing and commercializing fields. The reason for the speed and impact of 
this transformation (not only in the example of health) is the preparation of 
social spheres, which where reorganized by standardization, metrics and econ-
omization (which has brought in prices as another numerical standard). 
(2) Also numerical information is more and more essential as societal and 
private representation of “knowledge”, “facts”, “trends”, “evidences”, 
“proofs”, “values” etc. Foucault developed his concept while focusing on the 
organization as unit as the prison (as well as viewing on other organizations as 
fabrics or schools, see Foucault 1995). It is important to transgress this unit of 
the organization and to include individuals’ situations, “private environments”, 
as well as the situation of the society as a whole (or even globalized situa-
tions).15 The neoliberal life-world has been transformed into a more and more 
numerically organized sphere, in which for individuals the frontier between 
private and public life more and more dissolves.16 The reason is not only be-
cause individuals bring in their private life into the electronic, but vice versa, 
the workplace, private situations, and the public, as perceived by individuals, 
are more and more cognitively organized as numerical information. For exam-
ple, individual’s knowledge about health is represented by health apps and 
many individuals nowadays orient themselves towards benchmarks implement-
ed in health apps and communicated by mass media as numerical information. 
Many individuals have begun to feel as active subjects by reorienting their 
eating and sport behavior in accordance to these new devices. From a conven-
tion theory’s perspective and also from a Foucaultian perspective, these devic-
es, benchmarks, and mobilized practices also mobilize a specific concept of 
what “health” is. From EC’s perspective, it is evident that the statistical chains 
involved apply different conceptions of what is to be measured (and why med-
ics have other concepts and strategies to calculate as ordinary insurants), which 
is the reason why health data co-produced by developers of apps in health 
                                                                                                                                
receptions of panopticism and the discussion of post-panopticism the contributions in 
Brunon-Ernst (ed., 2016), Boyne (2000), and Gane (2012). 
15  This is one critique of Foucault’s notion of panopticism (Brivot and Gendron 2011). 
16  From a conventionalist perspective different logics of coordination, which convention 
theory has identified (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), are combined with these new strate-
gies of quantification. As one can see in the case of Airbnb, the combination of the domes-
tic convention and the industrial convention is enabled by establishing booking services for 
apartments as an Internet business, quantifying and “datafying” personal relationships. 
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insurance companies, self-quantifying individuals, and interpreting medical 
data will presumably result in invalid data not suited to realize common goods 
(as the improvement of public health). 
(3) In difference to Foucault’s description of panopticism as a strategy to 
discipline modern subjects in a more direct form (by disciplinary action as in 
prisons, the “disciplines” see above), statistical panopticism should be con-
ceived as a dispositive, which exerts power effects in an indirect form, imple-
menting statistical criteria of valuation and evaluation, generating quantified 
forms of knowledge in personal and social representations, present in situations 
of actors, in which individuals try to become subjects by fitting to these repre-
sentations, i.e., by conforming to numerical values, improving scores, achiev-
ing ranks etc. As Foucault has argued in his lectures on governmentality, ne-
oliberalism can be described as the implementation of situations, which are 
coined by competition and market-like conditions of evaluation and valuation, 
in which subjects become “entrepreneurs of themselves” (Foucault 2008; Gane 
2012; Laval 2018). Neoliberal governance is exerted by controlling the relevant 
aspects of competition and numerical information, which represent market-like 
(cognitive) structures. In regard to health, individuals’ behavior is influenced 
not only by public debate about public health issues and individuals’ health 
issues, but also by incenting individuals to apply health apps and to get reduced 
health insurance tariffs for this (as it is the case in Switzerland). The private 
situations of individuals are influenced by strategies of health insurance com-
panies, but also employers try to influence the health orientation of their em-
ployees nowadays by offering sport activities funded by the enterprise and by 
offering incentives for participation. These strategies generate data for the 
companies and insert elements of market-orientation by the insured person’s 
resp. by the employees, who realize possible negative consequences in case of 
not participating. 
(4) By speaking of statistical panopticism it is important to highlight its spe-
cific character which results in the generation and accumulation of huge masses 
of data as well as its centralization and marketization. Surveying social pro-
cesses by new informational technologies (as smart phones, computers) and 
behavior tracking sensors (in industrial machines, personal devices as smart 
phones but also in domestic devices at home) which are linked to the Internet, 
continuously generate huge masses of data. In first instance it is private enter-
prises as insurances, producers of consumer goods, advertising companies, 
financial analysists, energy providers, Internet companies and e-commerce 
enterprises, communication and transport services, which collect data. The 
Internet could have been seen once as a chance to democratize markets and the 
public sphere, because of its open network structure. But some Internet compa-
nies (as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Alibaba, Airbnb, Uber etc.) have achieved 
quasi-monopolistic positions and centralized the evaluation of actors. The way 
they calculate these evaluations is part of their business model and will not be 
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made public. These companies advance the centralization of data processing, 
thereby possibly misusing their quasi-monopolistic position (as Google’s 
search engines have for information retrieval, which is biased for commercial 
reason by Google). For some decades now, enterprises started to analyze these 
data to identify patterns and information, which could be exploited for com-
mercial purposes. Nowadays, companies specialize in the collecting, matching, 
analyzing, and trading of huge data sets as service for other companies. Today, 
there are almost no parts of everyday life, in which individuals do not leave 
digital traces. The announcement of these data traders and data analysists is to 
offer a fine-grained profile of individuals, to score their purchasing power, 
creditworthiness, health status, consuming preferences etc. To pick up the 
health example, it is interesting for health insurance companies to buy data sets 
offered on the market for data. Data generated by supermarket chains, travel 
agencies about consuming behavior or geo-data generated by telephone com-
panies or car producers can be statistically linked to “big data” and produce a 
more complete and fine grained analysis of the insured person. Afterwards, 
scores (for risks or tariffs) can be recalculated, incentives adjusted etc. Four-
cade and Healy 2017 [2013] have demonstrated that this concentration of data 
and the applied classification practices exert power and cause new inequalities 
not only in insurance tariffs but also in life chances (when medical treatment is 
given or denied on the basis of big data analysis and profiling of individuals 
behavior). 
(5) To realize the structuring power, statistical panopticism also has to im-
plement the asymmetry in communication and power, which means that actors 
have to admit quantifying dispositives (apps, rankings, indicators, etc.), to 
recognize scores as norms and values, and to accept them as dispositives with-
out questioning them (Beer 2016) and without questioning (or identifying) their 
basic conventions.17 The indicators proceeded by statistical panopticism as 
dispositives could be without substantial conventions, they could originally be 
implemented “ad hoc” (as by fiat-decisions of politicians) and without being 
part of coherent statistical chains. Here, a center of statistical panopticism 
(which in the panoptic architecture is the tower) can be “empty”, without any 
substantial foundation as the tower could be unmanned and empty in the pan-
optic architecture of a prison or a factory. Therefore, centralization as aspect of 
statistical panopticism does not refer to a single person, party, social class or 
organization, which resides in the center.18 Statistical panopticism is asymmet-
                                                             
17  Berns argues that statistics can exert directly and immediately influence on the moral of 
social collectives (Berns 2009, 81). 
18  This is one reason, why the concept of statistical panopticism is different from George 
Orwell’s “1984” dystopia (Orwell 1949). Also, statistical panopticism as portrait here for 
western societies, is not driven by a single totalitarian state and not based on a totalitarian 
ideology. This is the difference to the social credit point system in China, which could be-
come such an Orwellian dystopia (Botsman 2017). 
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ric as a one way mirror, because the “quantified individuals” and the actors 
underlying the influence of statistical panopticism can only see their own nu-
merical representations but not the “other side” of quantifying practices, which 
is the quantifying agency generating these numerical representations. In Fou-
cault’s analysis of panopticism, the disciplinary effect raised because individu-
als knew that they were observed in the panoptic architecture of the prison, but 
also in institutions as the factory, the school, etc. Nowadays, it could be argued 
that individuals do not (at least not completely) perceive surveillance by the 
Internet and computer-based processes of data production, analysis and by the 
feedback, in which the numerical representations in individuals’ situations are 
computed. The asymmetry could become (mostly) unconscious and one could 
argue that the disciplining effect should vanish. 
In the panopticon the occupants are constantly aware of the threat of being 
watched – this is the whole point – but state surveillance on the internet is in-
visible; there is no looming tower, no dead-eye lens staring at you every time 
you enter a URL. (McMullan 2015) 
Individuals as insurants could know well that data is gathered about their health 
condition, beginning with a questionnaire when entering the contract relation. 
Also medical examinations and counselling, clinical report after operations etc. 
should be known to be gathered by health insurance companies. But normally 
individuals do not know about the active big data analytics as described above. 
This analytical practice is mostly invisible to insured persons and usually not 
known by them. 
(6) For years now, mass media have reported about the tracking of behavior, 
about new technologies of surveillance, about computer software, cookies, and 
apps secretly collecting data. Paradoxically, public awareness on this panoptic 
situation came up by public critique, criticizing the disregard of individuals’ 
rights of privacy and individuals’ control of personal data. Today, individuals 
could know because of their different roles, e.g., as consumer, insurant, credit 
user, internet user, tax payer, account owner, car driver, smart phone user that 
their activities are tracked and the data traces they generate are collected and 
analyzed. Companies started to implement incentives and rewards for individu-
als, which are based on their behavior and the collection of data, a practice, 
which individuals now realize and admit. To continue the reference to the 
health example, health insurances offer reduced tariffs for insurants, who offer 
additional personal data via apps and who actively adopt their way of living to 
criteria defined by the health insurance. As a consequence, individuals step by 
step begin to conform to recognized evaluation criteria and to perform their 
live in accordance with the way, they hope appropriate for being valued and 
evaluated in a better way by these organizations and to receive better contract 
conditions or incentives. As a new phenomenon, there is an upcoming culture 
of numbers delivered to private companies as a result of self-quantifying by 
apps and the awareness of indicators which are related to individual behavior as 
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“performance indicators”, as numbers of visitors on social media sites, number 
of followers and so on. For scientists, nowadays, indicators as the h-index or 
Google scholar scores are established as criteria for recognition and evaluation 
in the scientific community. Espeland and Sauder (2016) recently argued that 
this form of conforming to numbers in science, can also be observed on the 
level of scientific departments and universities (the focus of Espeland and 
Sauder is the US NEWS ranking of law schools), which are reorganized due to 
the rankings of their internal professional structure, their power relations, ca-
reer opportunities and so on. For the national level another important example 
is this: For some years now, the People’s Republic of China has been imple-
menting a national scoring system, to evaluate the conformity of its citizens’ 
behavior. The Chinese social credit system combines big data with big data 
analytics, now driven by the Chinese state.19 What is astonishing here is that 
the Chinese state administration aims to make the scores of individuals (and 
other legal entities as enterprises) public information from the year 2020 on as 
scores of “trustworthiness” (Economist 2016; Botsman 2017). 
5.  The Deficiencies of Social Critique 
The mechanism of panopticism, described by Foucault, unfolds by the way 
actors conform to these developments and change their behavior according to 
these indicators, which are related to individual behavior and performance. 
This way, statistical panopticism establishes itself as a form of neoliberal gov-
ernance. Here, indicators exert governance, without political deliberation of the 
principles (i.e., conventions), indicators (as well as their representation, appli-
cation and publication) are built on. From a pragmatist perspective, it is evident 
that actors reflect their situation in times of digitalization and the Internet. They 
have a good sense of the real agency, which does not influence single individu-
als but algorithms and their outputs, which are figures. The “panoptical mo-
ment” rises, when actors realize this condition as important of their situation: a 
digital life world, offering more and more indicators on individual performance 
(Beer 2016). For individuals, the (scientific) validity of these indicators does 
not (!) matter first. What matters is the perceived impression that individuals 
will be rewarded or sanctioned by these indicators and that other individuals as 
well as the public will care also about these figures.  
                                                             
19  In Germany, one of the first state-driven forms of big data analysis was the computer-based 
dragnet investigation (“Rasterfahndung”), which was applied by the Federal Criminal Police 
Office (“Bundeskriminalamt”) to find the members of the West German terrorist group RAF 
in the 1970s. Therefore, different and huge data bases were compiled to detect suspect pat-
terns of civilian behavior (Bergien 2017). 
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The paradox of statistical panopticism as a form of political governance is 
that its inner core, the collective foundation of indicators on conventions, 
which support the collective achievement of a common good, is empty. The 
argument here is that statistical panopticism is characterized by its inner void, 
which centralizes power effects and knowledge, thereby avoiding participation 
and deliberation. This makes statistical panopticism a neoliberal governance 
structure.20 Conformity, discipline, and competition between individuals is 
implemented by generating numerical benchmarks (scores, ratings, rankings, 
etc.), without offering to collectives and to the public insight, transparency, 
intelligibility and this way a full understanding of what figures represent. 
Thomas Berns (2009) has interpreted this situation as “governing without gov-
erning” (gouverner sans gouverner). The neoliberal governance aims for pri-
vate profits not for common goods. Statistical panopticism is part not only of 
centralization and invisibilization of data generation conventions, but also part 
of strategies of extending the influence of private agencies (privatization). 
Christian Laval (2018) has systematically presented Foucault’s contribution to 
the analysis of neoliberalism. For Foucault, the neoliberal form of governance 
is characterized by implementing market-like conditions in situations actors 
have to adapt to. More and more situations are characterized by competition as 
social logic of behavior. Power is exerted in an indirect way, by structuring 
situations in which actors behave accordingly, instead of disciplining actors 
directly. Power in statistical panopticism loses its character of directly access-
ing individual bodies and behavior. Instead (1) actors are equipped with the 
idea of being subjects who maximize their own utility in terms of labor market 
value and (2) actors’ environments are transformed to market-like situations in 
which individuals act as self-entrepreneur (entrepreneurs de lui-même). Mar-
kets become the normative “milieu” for subjects. Neoliberal power is exerted 
by the coordinated influence on actor’s orientation and on situations (Laval 
2018, chap. 3; Foucault 2008). Quantification plays a fundamental role for this 
power effect by simultaneously penetrating situations with numerical represen-
tations and structuring actors’ cognition and orientation to impose competition 
and self-control. Statistical panopticism emerges as the new condition of living 
also from the viewpoint of ordinary actors. But, even if actors experience self-
quantification as a form of self-control, this neoliberal form of governance 
should be interpreted as self-control without control (echoing Thomas Berns) 
and as governing situations by numbers (echoing Alain Desrosières), structur-
ing representations, and cognitive structures. This is the neoliberal articulation 
of Foucault’s notion of power-knowledge. As a neoliberal form of governance, 
statistical panopticism can avoid legitimation and critique by avoiding trans-
parency of its power-knowledge effects. It is this camouflage or the lack of 
                                                             
20  See for a discussion of panopticism as a dispositive of (neo)liberal governance Gane (2012). 
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publicly visible, criticizable, and justifiable conventions (in this sense: its void 
– comparable to the unmanned tower in Foucault’s concept of panopticism), 
which characterizes statistical panopticism from EC’s perspective. 
Critics of big data analytics have argued that predictions on the bases of “big 
data analytics” cannot claim to be a valid assessment (O’Neil 2016). In the case 
of predictive recidivism, it has been empirically shown that the software, used 
by judges to evaluate the risk of recidivism, was not able to deliver predictions, 
which performed better than the estimates given by laymen (Dressel and Farid 
2018). Big data-based predictions or indicators, applied to self-quantification, 
are not questioned by everyday actors, who use them. The results create influ-
ential social facts, although they cannot be regarded as valid measurements per 
se. To variegate the classic Thomas-theorem, one could state that indicators 
have real consequences, when individuals take them for real, which is pragmat-
ically to take them as relevant cognitive reference points.21 
Contemporary societal and individual representation is more and more per-
vaded by statistical information which actors, organizations, nations rely on 
(Zuboff 1988; Beer 2016). As mentioned, the demand for quantifying more 
parts of social spheres and social behavior is increasing, while skepticism 
against quantification is rising also (Desrosières 2015). Criticism has developed 
two main strategies, which both seem to be deficient. (1) One form of critique 
against quantifying and the power-knowledge effects of statistical panopticism 
at all is to argue that numbers, figures and statistics are invalid formats of 
knowledge and evaluation. This strategy of criticism fails to develop institu-
tional and societal power because it does not offer an alternative to modern 
needs of far-ranging forms of knowledge, formats enhancing comparisons, 
descriptions and communications of huge amounts of individuals, goods, deci-
sions, and so on. This is the reason why quantification is the most powerful 
cognitive format in modern times (Porter 1995; Beer 2016). The strategy which 
is applied here is to resist quantification, not to take part in surveys, not to 
leave data traces in the Internet, etc.22 This way actors try to become “invisible” 
for tracing and surveilling technologies, in short, actors try to symmetrize the 
asymmetry of panopticism enforcing invisibility on both sides.23 The perfidy of 
statistical panopticism is to offer individuals the illusion of self-deciding about 
their data production. (2) The other strategy is to criticize statistical panopti-
cism for not conforming to the expectation that indicators have to have a sub-
                                                             
21  The original Thomas theorem stated “If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1921, 571-2). 
22  Desrosières (2015) has named this kind of resistance, arguing against the power effects of 
social research and national statistics also “retroaction”. See also Foucault’s notion of cri-
tique, familiar to Desrosières’ concept of retroaction, which is based on a concept of re-
sistance (Foucault 2007b). 
23  This strategy is known to economic sociologists, because it is important for informal econo-
mies as described by Porter and Haller (2005). 
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stantial definition as a basis, i.e., indicators have to be grounded on conven-
tions, which were deliberated by experts and can be justified in the (scientific) 
public. From a conventionalist perspective, this critique is based on the indus-
trial convention and the civic convention, which assume an inner rationality of 
indicators that can be criticized by experts and citizens and which can be justi-
fied publicly also. But, if the center of statistical panopticism is a void, then 
critique will fail, because there is no publicly visible and/or foundational con-
vention residing to be addressed. The critique will find no target. Statistical 
panopticism does not correspond to the logic of industrial coordination and 
civic coordination, because it does not pursue a common good. Corresponding-
ly, it does not aim for scientific purposes or standards but for private purposes. 
Therefore, one could argue that statistical panopticism is close to the domestic 
convention.24 But for EC the domestic convention has a semantic core, an 
inherent narration which grounds quality and justice. All in all, this second 
strategy of criticism fails because it addresses its critique to the level of con-
ventions, which can be criticized and justified publicly, as Boltanski and Thé-
venot (2006) have argued for conventions as the industrial, the civil or the 
domestic convention. These conventions do govern statistical chains of national 
statistical institutes or social research organizations, but not the areas of data 
production and distribution, which are run by private companies. 
From the perspective of EC, these data (as formats, data as knowledge and 
dispositives), generated and analyzed by private companies can be conceptually 
linked to regimes of engagement below the level of critique and justification. 
Laurent Thévenot (2014) has identified these regimes of engagement as the 
“engagement in a plan”, the “engagement in familiarity” and the “engagement 
in exploration”. The concept of regimes of engagement much better grasps the 
power-knowledge effects, which are mobilized by statistical panopticism. Indi-
viduals become subjects in the Foucaultian meaning of the term, by structuring 
their everyday life, their privacy (social network, leisure activities), and their 
working environment by numerical representations which are offered by quan-
tifying devices and other services of private companies (see above). Thévenot’s 
regimes of engagement emphasize actors’ capacities to cope with a personal 
environment equipped with objects and cognitive forms. Thévenot focuses on 
agency, not on dominance. In fact, the strategy applied by many individuals 
here is to dismiss collective critique, to adapt to the situation of quantified life-
worlds and to regard the new quantifying technical devices and data as tools to 
manage their personal environment in a more sovereign, i.e., in a data-based 
and this way by a (presumably) “scientifically informed” mode of realizing 
individual goals (personal fitness) or common goods (reducing health care 
costs) by individual engagement. It is Foucault, who interpreted the two sides 
                                                             
24  In fact, some arguments of Thomas Berns link governance based on numbers (statistics) to 
the domestic style of governance (see for example Berns 2009, 12). 
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of individuals’ agency as a capacity for self-governance (Foucault 1988). The 
perfidy of statistical panopticism is to offer individuals the illusion of self-
controlling their personal environment. In fact, the data generated are based on 
opaque procedures, defined ad hoc (without conventions) or possibly on con-
ventions (definitions), which are not transparent to the users in their personal 
environments. The illusion of self-control is mobilized, when users add mean-
ing to and interact with these data by “improving” them (e.g., trying to reduce 
cholesterol levels, raise numbers of steps per day etc.) without knowing how 
these indicators are measured by technical devices and – more important – 
without knowing if these criteria are validly related to personal goals (as per-
sonal health) or collective goals (as growth of welfare) at all. Power is exerted 
in different steps: (1) (cognitively) structuring situations by numerical data,25 
(2) making actors recognize and accept data as meaningful and valid represen-
tations and (3) influencing actors’ behavior by incenting actors to “improve” 
data. As Laval (2018) has shown, this is the Foucaultian (and more indirect) 
power effect in neoliberal societies and their situations, when competition is 
implemented in situations by individual self-management based on quantitative 
information. 
6. The Coming Crisis of Scientific Knowledge or Bringing 
Social Sciences Back In? 
Nowadays, the politics of indicators, the intransparency of indicators, indicator-
based political governance and power are criticized by many social scientists 
and sociological approaches as EC. Today, statistical panopticism is mainly 
discussed under the heading of “big data” and their problems. Big data pro-
cesses nowadays are based on distributed technologies and distributed as well 
as presumably incoherent algorithms (Dourish 2016). In addition, many medi-
ating technologies are involved, undermining the coherence of statistical chains 
also. Incoherence along the statistical chain invalidates the meaning of data and 
undermines the validity of indicators, constructed to achieve a common good. 
Coherent and visible statistical chains should be expected to unfold powerful 
forms of data generation when perceived as valid (legitimate). In this case the 
statistical chain will be recognized, inspected and deliberated as a whole. Its 
legitimacy can only be questioned in public be questioning the whole chain. 
But statistical chains can exert power even if they are burdened by incoher-
ence and are opaque to actors. This power is then not exerted on the basis of 
valid data or their valid interpretation, but in this case on the basis of misrecog-
                                                             
25  Here, EC‘s concept of “investment in form“ is an example for this structuring effect (Boltan-
ski and Thévenot 2006; Diaz-Bone 2018).  
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nition and misinterpretation of data, in this case the statistical chain will be 
recognized and deliberated only by its parts. Power effects, here, can hardly be 
efficiently criticized, because of this opacity of the incoherence of the whole 
chain. The privatization and invisibility of conventions along the statistical 
chain, the opacity of some of its elements and the illegitimate power effects 
based on this are EC’s critical perspective on big data (Diaz-Bone 2016). Roger 
Burrows and Mike Savage have argued that there is a coming crisis of tradi-
tional research methods of social sciences, because they are not designed to 
cope with the new type of data, represented by big data (Savage and Burrows 
2007; Burrows and Savage 2014).26 However, the more important problem, 
which Desrosières (2011b) already indicated, is to have private agencies, inter-
national NGOs and enterprises as institutions, which generate and analyze big 
data but also implement their own indicators for objects as counselling, report-
ing, evaluation and valuation. Indicators are step by step privatized as the pow-
er-knowledge production is.27 The coming crisis is not a crisis of methods first 
and foremost, it could be a crisis of social sciences and their position in society 
in total, supplanting public (funded) institutions devoted to aim for common 
welfare and common goods. 
The real challenge for social sciences nowadays is to cope with privately 
generated quantifications as business knowledge as an upcoming rival, compet-
ing with traditional science (and its institutions) for the definition not only of 
assets, but also social facts, public problems, and policies, and as bases for 
governance. The developments and the statistical panopticism sketched in this 
contribution should not result in a fundamental skepticism about quantification 
and indicators. Without numbers and quantification no modern society, econo-
my or organization would be possible. Instead, agreements and institutional 
cooperation between social research infrastructures (as GESIS in Germany, 
FORS in Switzerland), national state institutions, international agencies, NGOs 
and global operating enterprises will be needed to occupy the void of statistical 
panopticism and to transform its empty center to a democratic dispositive aim-
ing for common goods and public interests. A first step for this could be the 
implementation of an institutional structure for the deliberation of conventions 
indicators are based on, between scientists, public actors and other stakehold-
ers, and a pragmatist monitoring of public policies, based on indicators, making 
indicators and indicator-based policies an experimental public domain aiming 
for societal amelioration and advancement – as it was sketched already by the 
                                                             
26  Also, social scientists teaching and researching in institutions as universities won’t have 
access to many data bases. The exception is the analysis of publicly accessible Internet data 
via scraping technics (see Foster et al. 2017). Most big data are produced by the privately 
owned technologies and technical infrastructures of enterprises – inaccessible for “ordinary” 
social science research.  
27  This trend is in line with the privatization of science itself as well as the privatization of its 
results, contributions (as patents) in the era of neoliberalism (Mirowski 2011). 
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classical pragmatist John Dewey (1938) or as it is nowadays proposed by the 
economist Amartya Sen (Salais 2016). 
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